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Employment Discrimination

By Susan A. Cahoon*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During 1980, the Fifth Circuit again had a full docket of employment
discrimination cases. For the most part, the cases tended to turn on the
particular facts at issue, and there were few pronouncements by the court
of broader significance. An en banc court did decide an important question about limiting communications in class actions,' and a panel of the
court considered for the first time, whether there is an implied private
cause of action to sue for discrimination against the handicapped under
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Fifth Circuit also continued to follow a unique approach to the burden of proof in actions
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 that has recently
been addressed and reversed by the Supreme Court." The court of
appeals did clarify some difficult res judicata issues with respect to the
overlapping litigation that may exist because of the power of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) to make
an individual's charge of discrimination the basis for a suit by the Commission itself. The court continued its tendency to affirm a denial of class
certification if, by the time of the appeal, there has been an adverse ruling on the merits of the representative plaintiff's personal claims that
may be affirmed on appeal. Although more age discrimination cases
reached the court in 1980, they were for the most part resolved by application of the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review.
* Partner in Kilpatrick & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia.

Emory University (B.A.,

1968).

Harvard University (J.D., 1971). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
607 (1980).
2. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980).
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 87 Stat. 355, is codified at
29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (hereinafter cited as Title VII).
4. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
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BUR'DEN OF PROOF

Employment discrimination litigation cases have looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green5 as the paradigm of the order and allocation of proof. In McDonnell Douglas, the
Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing
that he is a member of a protected group, that he sought employment
with the defendant, that he was qualified for the position at issue, that he
was not selected, and that the employer continued to seek others to fill
the position. The great confusion in the Fifth Circuit has been over what
is really meant by a prima facie case. Although the Fifth Circuit has used
the model of McDonnell Douglas in its evaluation of the order and allocation of proof for both cases brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 7 and cases brought under Title VII, the court
managed to reach a different interpretation of the meaning of McDonnell
Douglas for the two statutes. The schizoid approach of the Fifth Circuit,
however, must now come to an end because of the decision of the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Burdine9 confirmed a series of opinions
by that court holding that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the defendant not merely to produce evidence, but to
persuade the fact finder that illegal discrimination was not the basis for
its action. Although the Supreme Court has spoken of the employer's
ability to rebut a prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action,10 the Fifth Circuit had required the defendant to prove nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderance of the
evidence ever since its opinion in Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc.."
Once locked into that conclusion, successive Fifth Circuit opinions iterated the formulation of Texas Instruments with little new thought. In
Burdine, the Fifth Circuit took this even further by imposing upon the
employer the duty to prove, by objective comparitive evidence, that those
hired or promoted were somehow better qualified than the plaintiff.
In contrast, the court of appeals has followed a different rule of law for
Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims. The court had held that
under the ADEA all that is required after the prima facie case is estab5.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

6. Id. at 802.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
8. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
9. 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979).
10. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1979);
Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
11. 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977).
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lished is for the employer to go forward with evidence tending to show a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.12 During the same
term in which Burdine was decided by the Supreme Court, the court of
appeals affirmed, in Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 1 3 that "the employer does not have to show the legitimate reason for discharge by a
preponderance of the evidence, rather he merely has to come forward
with relevant evidence to satisfy his burden of production."14 The court
in Harpringexplicitly noted that "the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion at all times. .. .
The Supreme Court's opinion in Burdine appears to go out of its way
to remind the Fifth Circuit of the difference between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion and, by the unanimity of the opinion, to tell the Fifth Circuit that the Court had meant what it said in its
other cases holding that all the prima facie case does is place some burden on a defendant to come forward with evidence. The Court explained
this basic distinction and the role of the prima facie case as follows:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the
trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence and if the employer is silent
in face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case."6
The Supreme Court made it clear that the phrase "to articulate" a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason requires the presentation of some evidence; for without evidence, there is nothing for the trier of fact to consider.17 However, all that evidence need do is raise a genuine issue of fact
as to whether the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.1 8
Once an employer has presented a lawful reason for its decision, the
presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted. At that point, the
employee may still prevail if he persuades the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reasons were merely a pretext.
That is, the plaintiff may show that the stated reasons were not the true
reasons for the employment decision, but instead the plaintiff was the
victim of intentional discrimination as alleged. 1'
The Court also found error in the requirement imposed in Burdine by
12.
Bittar
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See, e.g., Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 966, 967 (5th Cir. 1978);
v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 409.
101 S.Ct. at 1094.
Id. at 1094 n.9.
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
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the Fifth Circuit that the employer must prove by objective evidence that
the person hired or promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. Instead, it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly-situated employees were not treated equally.2 0 Title VII does not demand preferential treatment of minorities or females nor does it seek to destroy all
management prerogatives; it is not an affirmative action statute that requires employers to select practices that maximize the number of minorities or women it hires."1 The Supreme Court concluded that the approach
taken by the Fifth Circuit virtually required an employer to hire a minority or female applicant if that person's objective qualifications were equal
to those of a white male applicant. 22 Provided that no unlawful selection
criteria are used, an employer in fact has discretion to choose among
equally qualified candidates. 21 Even if a court believes that the employer
misjudged the qualifications of an applicant, that fact is not in itself sufficient to expose an employer to Title VII liability, although it may help
convince the fact finder that the stated reason was a pretext."4
There were several cases decided during 1980 that might have come
out differently had the court followed the standards laid down by the
Supreme Court in reversing Burdine. For example, in Merriweather v.
Hercules, Inc.," the court may have erred in substituting its own judgment for the employer's about whether admitted differences in the work
history of the black plaintiff and a comparison white employee justified
treating them differently. This difference was the employer's reason for
the different treatment. Without holding that the employer's reason was
a mere pretext, the court upheld a special master's conclusion that this
reason was not "legitimate."'
In Davis v. Jackson County Port Authority, the court virtually imposed an affirmative action obligation on the employer. In that case, there
were pending applications from the plaintiff, a qualified black female, and
two white females. Although the plaintiff's application stated minimum
salary demands in excess of what the job paid, whereas the white applicants were willing to work for that amount, the court held that the employer had discriminated against the plaintiff because of her race by failing to invite her for interviews. As in Merriweather, the employer's

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1096.
Id. at 1096-97.
Id. at 1097.
Id.
Id.
631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1167.
611 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1980).
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reason was not deemed to be a "legitimate" one.2 8 Both cases probably
would have been decided differently if the Supreme Court's decision in
Burdine had been available when they were considered.
III.

RES JUDICATA AND OTHER FINALITY ISSUES

The court decided two cases during 1980 in which it had to rule upon
the consequences of an employer's success in an action brought by the
EEOC to the subsequent ability of the individual whose charge was the
basis for the EEOC's suit to maintain his own cause of action. In effect,
the court concluded that if the employer prevailed in the EEOC suit in a
manner that resulted in a determination on the merits, this determination renders the individual's claim res judicata, even if the individual
never intervened in or otherwise became a party to the Commission's lawsuit based on his charge. Thus, in Truvillion v. King's DaughtersHospital,"9 in which the employer succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of the
Commission's claims because of its failure to have satisfied jurisdictional
prerequisites for the maintenance of its action, the court held that neither
the EEOC itself nor the charging party would be precluded from maintaining a second action. This conclusion was reached because of the provision in Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that dismissals under that subdivision of the rule and any other dismissals not
provided for in the rule "other than a dismissal for a lack of jurisdiction,
for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19 [operate]
as an adjudication upon the merits." In contrast, an employer who has
obtained dismissal of an EEOC action because of the Commission's inexcusable and prejudicial delays in processing the charge of discrimination
obtained what amounted to an adjudication on the merits for purposes of
res judicata, even though there had never been a judicial determination of
whether discrimination had in fact occurred. Under those circumstances,
the court held in Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co.2 0 that the individual charging party was bound by the adverse results of the EEOC's litigation with
the employer.
The Fifth Circuit construed Title VII creatively in Truvillion to deal
with one potential problem for the individual whose charge is made the
basis of an action by the EEOC itself. That is, ordinarily and under the
literal language of the statute, once the EEOC has brought an action on a
charge, it loses power to issue a right-to-sue letter. However, the court
resolved this possible dilemma by holding that if the EEOC has been dismissed because of procedural deficiencies, rather than circumstances that
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 578.
614 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1980).
614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980).
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amount to an adjudication on the merits, it may correct its errors and file
its own suit a second time. It therefore follows, according to the court,
that it must also have the power to reinvest the charging party with the
ability to sue by issuing a right-to-sue letter.
In several other contexts the court was faced with problems of achieving finality from prior litigation. In Smith v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
Co.,81 the moving parties proceeded under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and attempted to modify the seniority provisions of a consent decree on the theory that the subsequent opinion of the
Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States8" showed that the relief was not warranted. The court was able to
reject this attempted modification because of the lapse of time since the
entry of the decree. 88
The court also turned back efforts of members of a class whose class
action claims.had been resolved by a consent decree to pursue subsequent
individual employment discrimination claims. In both Fowler v. Birmingham News Co.," and Kemp v. Birmingham News Co.,35 the court found
that the allegations in the original class action litigation were so closely
related to the cause of action that the plaintiffs now sought to pursue
that the doctrine of res judicata would have to apply.
IV. EEOC PRocEDup-L IssuEs
There were a number of opinions decided during the survey period that
addressed procedural questions involving EEOC lawsuits. In EEOC v.
Pet, Inc.,' the court agreed that the Commission had not followed its
statutory obligation to attempt to conciliate with the employer but held
that the proper remedy would have been to order a stay, as permitted by
42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(f)(1).17 In that case, an individual charging
party had initially alleged discrimination in connection with his termination but later amended his charge to add allegations of discrimination
against blacks through the alleged existence of segregated job classifications and segregated facilities. The Commission had found reasonable
cause to believe that the discharge was discriminatory and that the employer maintained segregated facilities and departments. It thereupon invited the parties to participate in informal attempts to settle the charge.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

615 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1980).
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
615 F.2d at 685.
608 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1979).
608 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1979).
612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976).
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The employer indicated willingness to engage in conciliation on the class
allegations, while insisting that it did not intend to offer reemployment or
back pay to conciliate the individual charging party's allegations. At this
point the EEOC notified the employer that it regarded the conciliation
endeavors as having failed and made no attempt to accept the employer's
offer to endeavor to conciliate the class issues. This conduct was deemed
by the trial court and the court of appeals to fall short of the Commission's obligation' to make a good faith attempt at conciliation. On the
other hand, the court did not feel that dismissal was appropriate when at
least some attempt had been made towards conciliation, even though that
attempt did not go as far as it must.
The court also affirmed, in EEOC v. Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co.,"
that the Commission has power to initiate a lawsuit whenever its investigation of a charge discloses discrimination, even if it has found no reasonable cause to believe that the charging party whose allegation precipitated the investigation in the first place was a victim of discrimination.39
So long as the matters that the Commission investigated and on which its
lawsuit is based were reasonably related to the original charge and the
employer was given a reasonable opportunity to conciliate, the EEOC is
not precluded from litigating because it also decides that the original
charging party's specific claim is without merit. Judge Reavley, in dissent,
argued that 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(b) 40 precludes any effort by the
EEOC to proceed with the charge to the conciliation stage unless it decides that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.
Because the EEOC's authority to file suit is couched with reference to
litigating after informal conciliation endeavors have proved fruitless,' 1
Judge Reavley concluded that it follows that the Commission cannot sue
when it has found no reasonable cause to believe that the charge filed by
the complaining party is true. To Judge Reavley, the practical effect of
the majority opinion is to hold that the EEOC, without filing an independent charge as it is entitled to do through the Commissioner's charge procedure,'8 may nevertheless institute suit whenever it decides that an unlawful practice has been uncovered, even though there is no valid charge

38. 614 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. To the extent that the majority also relied on the notion that the EEOC is a statutory class member as a basis for its representation of class discrimination claims uncovered
during its investigation of the original charge, that rationale has been undermined by the
Supreme Court's decision in General Tele. Co. v. EEOC, 100 S. Ct. 1698 (1980). The Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit had erred in holding that the EEOC must satisfy
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 requirements when it seeks relief on a class basis.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-6 (1976).
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4
pending before it."
During 1980, the court also acted to eliminate the possibility of em-

ployer counterclaims against the Commission for alleged harassment or
malicious prosecution. In EEOC v. First National Bank,"" the employer

by way of answer included as an affirmative defense and as a counterclaim allegations that the lawsuit had been brought maliciously, in conspiracy with the charging party. The employer then sought discovery regarding information about the charging party, who it alleged was a
"chronic complainer" who had approximately forty-five pending charges

against other employers. 48 Despite an order by the magistrate to whom
discovery matters had been assigned, the EEOC failed to comply with
this discovery request, whereupon the district court had dismissed the
action with prejudice and awarded attorney's fees and costs to the employer. The district court had held that the counterclaim, in the nature of
a charge of malicious prosecution, was authorized by the Federal Tort
Claims Act" or, alternatively, that the claim was in the nature of a recoupment that is a compulsory counterclaim under the Federal Rules of
7

Civil Procedure.4

To determine whether the district court correctly dismissed the claims

as a sanction for the Commission's failure to respond to discovery, the
Fifth Circuit found it necessary to analyze whether, either as an affirmative defense, a recoupment claim or an independent counterclaim, the
purported conspiracy or bad faith of the EEOC could give rise to a cause
of action.4" The court first held that the Federal Tort Claims Act expressly precludes litigation arising out of malicious prosecution or abuse
of process and therefore could not be a basis upon which the employer

could claim that sovereign immunity had been waived.49 The kind of
43. 614 F.2d at 1026 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
44. 614 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. Id. at 1006.
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
48. Throughout the survey period, the court displayed great reluctance to have an employment discrimination plaintiff's claims dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply
with procedural requirements in the conduct of the litigation. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Honeywell, Inc., 622 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1980); Luna v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 614 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1980); Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610
F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1980). The court has made it clear that, especially in employment discrimination cases, dismissal with prejudice isan extreme sanction that is warranted only
when there is "a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff...." Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1967). The only case in 1980 that
affirmed such a dismissal with prejudice occurred when the plaintiff, despite actual notice of
the scheduling of her deposition and of a court order to retain new counsel, ignored both.
Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
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power given to EEOC agents to have access to an employer's premises
and records does not constitute a power to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests. Accordingly, the EEOC's personnel are not "investigative or law enforcement officers" within the meaning of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, which does permit actions for malicious prosecution or
abuse of process to be brought against investigative or law enforcement
officers.50 The ruling that the counterclaim was maintainable in recoupment was also deemed erroneous because recoupment requires that the
claim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the government's suit. 1 Although the counterclaim had some
connections to the EEOC's principal claims, the court deemed it too tenuous and indirect to warrant use of the doctrine of recoupment. Similarly,
harassment was not an affirmative defense to alleged Title VII violations
because the malicious prosecution and harassment, even if true, did not
relate to the primary issue in the Title VII action, namely whether the
employer had unlawfully discriminated. Because the affirmative defense
and counterclaim should have been stricken, the EEOC's failure to respond to discovery related to the defense and counterclaim could not warrant imposition of sanctions. Judge Reavley concurred in this result but
expressed some concern with dictum in the first footnote of the majority
opinion, 52 which suggested that the opinion in Brookhaven Bank & Trust
Co. somehow precluded the employer from asserting on remand a need to
abate the lawsuit because of the Commission's failure to attempt informal
conciliation. Judge Reavley believed that the Brookhaven Bank case did
not raise any issue about an employer's right to have had a conciliation
opportunity.58 It is difficult to discern what meaning the majority intended for the footnote reference to Brookhaven Bank & Trust unless the
footnote merely suggests to the trial court that, even if it believed the
employer's assertion that the original charging party was a chronic complainer (and indeed, the EEOC had found no reasonable cause as to that
individual's claim), the issue would be whether any conciliation attempts
were made by the EEOC with respect to the broader class claims it made
as a result of its investigation. If the footnote was intended to mean anything more than that, then Judge Reavley's concern is understandable.
The court also decided, in Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,"
that the EEOC may amend its "cause" determination after it has issued a
"no cause" finding and a right-to-sue letter, provided the amendment
occurs before the expiration of the ninety-day period following receipt of
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
614 F.2d at 1008 (citing Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1967)).
614 F.2d at 1006 n.1.
Id. at 1009 (Reavley, J., concurring).
610 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the suit letter within which the charging party must bring suit. The
EEOC's communications to charging parties about the right to sue also
continued to produce some confusion during 1980. Thus, in Crawford v.
Western Electric Co., 5 1the EEOC did not provide sufficient notice of the
failure of conciliation and of its intention not to bring its own action on
their behalf by the mere sending to the charging parties of a copy of correspondence between the Commission and the respondent and of a conciliation agreement between the EEOC and the respondent. Neither of
these documents contained an unconditional statement to the charging
parties that the EEOC intended not to sue. Similarly, in Key v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc.,51 although the EEOC notified the charging party of its
"no cause" determination and of the charging party's right to initiate a
lawsuit, the letter also contained misleading language that could have
caused the charging party to believe that the ninety-day suit filing period
did not begin to run until he requested a specific right-to-sue letter.
The EEOC's subpoena powers also were the subject of consideration
during the survey period. In EEOC v. Mississippi College,"7 the court
concluded that because the employment practices of a religious institution were not automatically exempt from Title VII coverage (although a
religious institution's decision with respect to the employment of a minister would be), the EEOC had the power to conduct an investigation.
Thus, the Commission was at least entitled to investigate whether there
was any employment discrimination not justified by the legitimate religious preferences of a religious educational institution and was entitled to
have its investigative demands enforced. In EEOC v. Cuzzens of Georgia,
Inc.," the court held that an employer may not move to quash a subpoena from the EEOC without first exhausting administrative procedures, unless the basis for objecting to the subpoena rises to the level of a
constitutional objection. On the other hand, in EEOC v. First Alabama
Bank," the court affirmed the district court's decision that it would not
enforce the EEOC's subpoena. When the EEOC delays unreasonably in
seeking enforcement and the employer is thereby prejudiced, a district
court may refuse to enforce the subpoena.
V.

CLASS

ACTION ISSUES

During 1980 the court sitting en banc decided Bernard v. Gulf Oil

55.
56.
57.
58.

614
611
626
608

59.

611 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1980).

F.2d
F.2d
F.2d
F.2d

1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
602 (5th Cir. 1980).
477 (5th Cir. 1980).
1062 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Co., s° and adopted as the majority opinion the reasoning of Judge
Godbold's dissent from .the panel opinion." The court thus ruled that the
trial court's use of an order modeled on the Manual for Complex Litiga-

tion"5 unduly restricted the freedom of class counsel to communicate with
class members. The facts in Bernard and the reasoning behind Judge
Godbold's conclusions were detailed at length in the 1979 Fifth Circuit
Survey" and will not be repeated here. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari on this issue" and should render a decision during the 19801981 term.

The court followed its tendency to affirm the denial of class certification if it is able also to affirm an adverse decision on the merits of the
representative plaintiff's personal claim.' This approach continues to
draw criticism from some of the members of the court who fear that errors in class action determinations thereby are immunized from proper
appellate review." The court also continued to follow Grigsby v. North

Mississippi Medical Center, Inc.,s7 and to dismiss the claims of class
members without prejudice if a class action has been certified but the
representative plaintiff and his counsel fail to represent the class claims

adequately in the actual presentation of evidence at trial.es Although nu-

merous problems doomed several purported class actions,"s Judge Tuttle
ringingly reaffirmed, in Falcon v. General Telephone Co.,7 0 that the
"across the board" employment discrimination class action is very much

alive and well in the Fifth Circuit, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's
71

decision in East Texas Motor Freight Co. v. Rodriguez.
In Falcon, Judge Tuttle not only found that an incumbent employee's
promotion claims had a sufficient, nexus to the claims of persons who had

60. 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 607 (1980).
61. 596 F.2d 1249, 1262-76 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. The Manual for Complex Litigation is a collection of suggested procedures, written
by judges, for the handling of complex cases. It is reprinted as a supplement to C. WIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEUUR (1973).
63. 31 MERCER L. Rav. 921, 925-39 (1980).
64. 101 S. Ct. 607 (1980).
65. E.g., Shepard v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 617 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. Id. at 90-91 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
67. 586 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1978).
68. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1980).
69. Davis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 621 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Garcia v.
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.
1980).
70. 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980). Shortly before publication of the Fifth Circuit Survey,
the Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision in Falcon in light of its decision in
Burdine. 49 U.S.L.W. 3737 (Apr. 7, 1981).
71. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
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never been employed to enable the employee to represent both applicants
and employees, but in sweeping dicta he also proclaimed essentially that
there is usually a sufficient nexus to authorize across-the-board class action treatment so long as (1) there is no evidence at the outset that the
named plaintiff has no claim and (2) the named plaintiff shares with the
other members of the purported class the same racial, national origin,
sexual, or religious characteristics." Although the employer tried to argue
alternatively in Falcon that the named plaintiff's suit could not encompass hiring allegations because his charge of discrimination dealt only
with promotions, 'Judge Tuttle also rejected that argument. Instead, he
stated in equally sweeping terms that once the charging party had identified the basis of discrimination (in Falcon, national origin), other discrimination of the same variety, i.e., national origin discrimination, was sufficiently like or related to warrant Title VII jurisdiction.7 3 In a further
gratuitous comment, Judge Tuttle noted that a reasonable investigation
of promotion claims "almost inevitably" encompasses an employer's hir74
ing practices as well.
The Fifth Circuit did concede defeat gracefully during the 1980 term
on its past holding that when the EEOC seeks to represent the interest of
absent persons, it is acting as a representative plaintiff in a class action
and must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.7 5 Because the Supreme Court rejected this view in General
Telephone Co. v. EEOC,6 the court remanded in EEOC v. Peoples
Bank'7 7 for further consideration in light of that decision.
VI.

OTHER TITLE VII AND SECTION 1981 Issuas

There was a wide variety of substantive decisions under Title VII and
42 U.S.C. section 19817s during 1980. The most publicized decision may
have been the ruling in Garcia v. Gloor " that, under Title VII and section 1981, an employer may prohibit bilingual employees from speaking
72. 626 F.2d at 375, 375 n.7.
73. Id. at 377. In Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970), the
court had held that only claims which are reasonably related to the scope of claims that
reasonably could be investigated under the charge filed by the plaintiff are within the
court's jurisdiction under Title VII.
74. 626 F.2d at 377.
75. EEOC v. D. H. Holmes Co., 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962
(1978).
76. 100 S. Ct. 1698 (1980).
77. 623 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
79. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.), withdrawing 609 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 923 (1981).
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any language other than English during working hours. The Commission
reacted strongly to Gloor and quickly promulgated proposed guidelines
on national origin discrimination that would, if followed by the courts,
narrow considerably the circumstances under which an employer could
insist on English-only.80 However, a careful reading of the ultimate opinion in Gloor reveals that it is a rather narrow case involving the application of a limited English-only rule to a bilingual employee whose violation
of that rule reflected a personal choice, rather than the immutable consequence of his Hispanic national origin. Indeed, most of the differences
between the withdrawn original opinion and the final decision in the case
illustrate efforts to confine the implication of the decision to very similar
factual situations.
One opinion suggests that there are certain circumstances under which
intentional racial discrimination may be justified as a business necessity.
In Miller v. Texas State Board of Barber Examiners,8 ' a former employee alleged that he failed to report to work because of his reaction to
racially disparate job assignments. Thus, the employee argued, his termination for failure to report to work really was a constructive discharge
because of the underlying discriminatory job assignments.
Mr. Miller had been an undercover investigator for the Board. For the
first four years of his employment he investigated both white and black
barber shops. In 1969, he met with a supervisor, who explained that white
inspectors refused to inspect black barber shops because of fear of physical violence. Mr. Miller then agreed to inspect the black barber shops and
was duly promoted to the position of inspector, a position he held until
his termination in October, 1973. Unlike white inspectors, who were assigned a specific geographical area, his inspections were generally restricted to black barber shops, although he occasionally inspected Mexican-American shops and, infrequently, white shops. He never complained
of the assignments. According to the evidence, in 1973 the Board became
unhappy with Mr. Miller's work because he made unauthorized inspections outside of his normal geographic area, for which he was receiving
extra travel expense and per diem pay. There were also complaints about
the quality of his inspections. The Board then decided to transfer him to
a new job location in Houston. Mr. Miller refused to report to Houston
and did not give his supervisors any warning of his intention to disobey
the instructions. Accordingly, he was fired.
The evidence supported the conclusion that Miller was fired because he
refused to go to Houston as instructed, not because of his race. The novel
80. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980).
The new guidelines became effective December 29, 1980.
81. 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 9. Ct. 249 (1980).
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constructive discharge theory was similarly rejected, as the court noted
that the plaintiff for years had found the same conditions tolerable and
indeed had objected only after he was fired for a valid, nondiscriminatory
reason. The most likely inference from the record, according to the court
of appeals, was that the plaintiff objected to moving to Houston, not to
inspecting only black shops. 82 However, the court proceeded to make an
independent evaluation of whether Mr. Miller was entitled to any relief
because of his assignment to inspect only black barber shops.
The plaintiff clearly had been treated differently because of his race by
being assigned to inspect only those shops. The court of appeals acknowledged that there may have been error on the part of the district court in
holding that this assignment was justified by the business necessity of
having a black inspect the black shops because the white inspectors refused to do so. 88 The court's reservation about the availability of the business necessity defense was based upon the fact that intentional discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin is discussed under Title
VII in the context of the bona fide occupational qualification defense,"
whereas there is no express exception made for race discrimination." The
business necessity defense seems to have been developed for practices
facially neutral but discriminatory in operation. Yet, as the court noted,
the Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." did not have
any language that absolutely requires such a limitation of the doctrine. In
dictum, the court suggested that there are conceivable situations where a
business necessity or similar exception is warranted for intentional racial
discrimination, citing as an example the emergency situations described
in Baker v. City of St. Petersburg.8 7 In effect, the dictum recognizes that
there may be special circumstances under which race is crucial to successful job performance, although those circumstances of necessity will be
very limited. The examples offered by the court include undercover infiltration of an all-Negro criminal organization or emergency special assign.
ments of black patrolmen to black neighborhoods during times of unusually high racial tensions. Similarly, the use of Mr. Miller, a black man, to
be the undercover investigator of black barber shops probably would fall
within that kind of exception. Having spent several paragraphs of dictum
discussing these possibilities, the court then noted that the parties never
really addressed this as an issue and there was some question whether the
inspector (as opposed to the investigator) job assignments could be de82. Id. at 652.
83. Id.
84.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976).

85.

615 F.2d at 652.

86.
87.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).
400 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1968).
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fended under that kind of narrow role for a business necessity defense.
The court concluded that none of its speculation really mattered because
the plaintiff would not be entitled to any kind of award even if he prevailed. Because only equitable relief, such as back pay or reinstatement, is
available under Title VII, because Miller suffered no diminution in pay or
benefits, and because his discharge was valid, there was no remedy available. No injunction was needed because it was not a class action. Because
the discharge was proper, the plaintiff would not be an employee again
and therefore would not need the protection of an injunction. He also
could not recover punitive damages because they are a legal remedy and
are not available in a Title VII action. Because attorney's fees and costs
may be awarded only to a "prevailing party, '" and because Miller failed
to obtain any relief for himself, a class, or society in general,"9 he also
could not recover attorney's fees-he had not "prevailed". Thus, even if
the district court may have erroneously applied the business necessity
doctrine to Miller's assignment as an inspector, the plaintiff would not
have been entitled to any relief. Hence, the judgment below was affirmed.
In Harper v. Thiokol Chemical Corp.,90 the court held that an employer's policy of requiring women to remain on pregnancy leave until
they sustained a normal menstral cycle violated Title VII. The employer
did not offer a business justification for the policy but instead argued that
it was a facially neutral rule that did not favor one sex over another. The
court held, however, that the policy placed a burden on women that male
employees did not suffer. Hence, absent a business necessity for the policy, it discriminated against women.' 1
Two major consent decrees came before the court for review in 1980. In
United States v. City of Alexandria," the trial court had refused to approve a consent decree. The proposed consent decree would have imposed
hiring and promotional goals and included a hiring preference that operated to prefer black or female applicants over white males if both applicants were qualified for the job. Because these kinds of provisions were
neither unlawful, unreasonable nor contrary to public policy, the trial
court was found to have abused its discretion by refusing to approve the
decree. In an interesting procedural aside, it should be noted that the
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
89. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1977).
90. 619 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1980).
91. The court thus found the employer's policy analogous to the policy condemned by
the Supreme Court in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), rather than to an
employer's failure to pay women greater benefits because of sex-based differences in the
types of disabilities they may incur, a practice the Supreme Court upheld in General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
92. 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Fifth Circuit emphatically reaffirmed its view that the refusal of a court
to enter a consent decree proposed by the parties amounts to the refusal
to grant an injunction, if the proposed consent decree has any injunctive
provisions, and therefore is appealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1292(a)."
The Fourth Circuit had reached a contrary result in Carson v. American
Brands, Inc.." Subsequent to the opinion in United States v. City of
Alexandria, the Supreme Court reversed Carson v. American Brands,
Inc.,"9 and thereby confirmed the wisdom of the Fifth Circuit rule.
The City of Alexandria case was decided at the same time as United
States v. City of Miami," in which the court provides a detailed rationale
for its conclusion that goals and timetables may be part of affirmative
action so long as they are reasonably related to the legitimate state goal
of achieving equality of employment opportunity. In both cases the court
did review carefully the statistical data that, despite the language in the
consent decrees in question disclaiming employer liability, nevertheless
show the kinds of disparities that normally fulfill the plaintiff's burden in
making out a prima facie case. In the City of Miami case, the court also
discussed at length the arguments made by unhappy white male employees that the municipal government had improperly infringed their seniority rights. Even if the seniority system were immunized from attack
under Title VII because it was a bona fide system, that does not mean
that an employer can never voluntarily agree to change the system. It
merely means that the employer cannot be forced against its will to modify the system." In this regard, the white male employee's situation is
similar to that of the employee within a collective bargaining unit in
which the collective bargaining agreement may enhance the seniority status of certain employees, to further public policy interests beyond the
literal requirement of the statute, despite a detrimental impact on the
expectations of other employees. Similarly, an employer may voluntarily
consent to changes in seniority provisions that do not abridge contractual,
statutory or constitutional rights of employees or their bargaining agent."
In dictum, the court went so far as to say that even if employees had
rights that might be deemed "vested" under state law (for example, there
might have been some sort of contractual arrangement-either between
individual employees and the employer, or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement), the voluntary compliance policy of Title VII could
justify voluntary affirmative action programs that are reasonable under
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976).
606 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
49 U.S.L.W. 4171 (Feb. 25, 1981).
614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1341.

98. Id.
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the circumstances, even though such programs may interfere with these
so-called "vested rights.""
The court clarified the doctrine of constructive discharge as it applies
to employment discrimination plaintiffs in Bourque v. Powell Electrical
ManufacturingCo. 100 The concept of the constructive discharge has been
developed by the courts to protect an employee if the employer deliberately makes working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced
to resign. The employer cannot then claim that he is not as liable for the
illegal conduct as he would have been had the employee been fired.10 1 In
Bourque, the court rejected the employer's view that to constitute a constructive discharge, the imposition of intolerable working conditions must
be with the purpose of forcing the employee to resign. On the other hand,
the court will make an independent examination of the conditions imposed and will find a constructive discharge only if the conditions were so
difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person would have felt compelled
to resign. Using that standard, the plaintiff failed to prevail, because a
failure to receive equal pay for equal work is not so intolerable that it
requires a reasonable employee to resign.
In Ensley Branch of NAACP v. Seibels,10 2 the court approved Judge
Pointer's very detailed review of an employer's validation study and affirmed his holding that the employer had not furnished sufficient evidence of the validity of its employment tests, especially when used for
ranking purposes, to permit their continued use in the face of adverse
racial impact. The court did remand the decision for additional consideration of the question whether there was a period of time when the employer was complying with and in good faith relying upon certain EEOC
guidelines that permit the provisional use of validation data derived from
other sources if the employer is in the process of conducting an appropriate test validation study.108 The employer's validation studies also failed
to pass judicial review in Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing
14
Co. 0
Fisher also reflects the Fifth Circuit's approach to the use of statistical
evidence in employment discrimination cases. If an employer primarily
provides its own training for job qualifications and promotes from within
the employer will have little success in relying upon statistics that show
that its work force profile compares favorably with labor force statistics.
99. Id. at 1341-42.
100. 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
101. See Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
102. 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Martin v. Personnel Bd., 101 S.Ct.
784 (1980).
103. Id. at 822-25.
104. 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 929 (1981).
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Rather, the court will look to the promotion percentages in light of the
employer's own work force. 108 Similarly, the court indicated in Falcon v.
General Telephone Co. that it prefers to compare applicant flow data
with hiring data in a hiring discrimination case.1" 6 In Johnson v. Uncle
Ben's, Inc.,10 7 the court suggested that it might be appropriate to analyze
in a completely separate fashion the outside hiring data and the internal
promotion data if the employer both hired directly into the position at
issue and also promoted from within.
The prevailing approach with respect to the burden of proof when statistics are concerned also is reflected in Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.. The
court indicated that the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case by showing
a gross disparity of some sort, often between the general labor market
and the employer's work force. The burden is then upon the employer to
show the unacceptability of the statistical comparison. This opinion also
makes explicit something that most employers have realized by now. That
is, if the employer uses a subjective system for promotions or hiring and
there is a statistically significant difference between the selection rates
achieved by minorities or females in comparison to their availability in
whatever is deemed to be the relevant pool of available candidates, then
the employer cannot defend the system. 10 8 Swint v. Pullman-Standard,'°"
Fisher,110 and Crawford v. Western Electric Co.,"' implicitly reflect the
same conclusion.
There were a few questions about the scope of Title VII during the
survey period. In Quijano v. University Federal Credit Union,"' the
court held that a credit union that complies with the requirements of the
Federal Credit Union Act"' nevertheless is not a "private membership
club" for purposes of the exemption of such clubs from the coverage of
Title VII.1' In Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Association,1 18 the court also decided that the combination of race and sex
could be asserted as a basis for Title VII liability. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that she was a victim of discrimination because she was both
black and female. After a lengthy analysis of the "sex plus" employment
discrimination decisions, the court concluded that there was nothing in
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 544.
626 F.2d at 380-82.
628 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 427.
624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980).
613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980).
614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980).
12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1790 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1976).
615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the language or policy of Title VII that precluded recognition of this special subclass. Although Jefferies was not in itself a class action, the decision should offer encouragement to anyone who wishes to argue for a class
action comprised solely of black females.
In Ray v. Freeman,"'' the court adopted a fairly narrow view of the
degree to which a federal employee may bring a Title VII lawsuit that
includes as sources of liability any discrete acts of discrimination that.
have occurred after the filing of his charge. Because of the strong policy
reasons that are embodied in the requirement that a federal employee
follow procedures for review within the government before he may initiate a lawsuit, the court felt that it was inappropriate to permit postcharge acts of discrimination to be litigated without having been first
presented to the federal agencies by means of an administrative
complaint.
The court decided two interesting cases involving claims of retaliation
in violation of section 704(a) of Title VII."11 In Rosser v. Laborers' International Union," 8 the court held that a union employee's participation in
a union election campaign designed to defeat her supervisor because of
the union's alleged failure to represent black employees adequately was
not the kind of activity protected by section 704(a). In Jeffries v. Harris
County Community Action Association, '" the court also found that the
employee's conduct was outside the realm of permissible conduct opposing practices made unlawful by Title VII. In that case, the plaintiff justifiably was terminated because she began, without authorization, to copy
and distribute employment records and files that she thought were relevant to her claims.
In a case that confirms that the mandate of Title VII applies to discrimination by black employers as well as white employers, the court affirmed a jury's verdict" 0 that a predominately black college had discriminated against a white faculty member. The court reached this conclusion
in Whiting v. Jackson State University,"' under both Title VII and section 1981, noting that, in a disparate treatment case, both statutes require proof of intentional discrimination in essentially the same manner.
However, the court agreed with the jury that there was sufficient evidence
to support its verdict that the rebuttal offered by the school to the em116.
117.

626 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1980).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).

118. 616 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1980).
119. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
120. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages under section 1981 and was therefore
entitled to a jury trial of his section 1981 claims. Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d
116, 123 (5th Cir. 1980).
121. 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ployee's prima facie case was not sufficiently persuasive,12 and that instead the stated reasons were a mere pretext for discriminating against
the white plaintiff because of his race.
There were only two decisions during 1980 in which the court considered religious discrimination issues. In Howard v. Haverty Furniture
Companies, Inc.,12 2 the court affirmed a judgment in favor of the employer. The plaintiff, a part-time Methodist minister, made little effort to
work with his employer to achieve a reasonable accommodation of his
needs to be absent from work because of his ministerial responsibilities
and the employer's need to have him available as part of the sales force.
The employer's evidence showed that there had been a genuine business
need for the plaintiff's presence at work on the particular day in question,
because of a scheduled major sale, and that the plaintiff's unauthorized
absence forced the employer to use supervisory personnel to perform his
job, to the detriment of their regular duties. The fact that the employer
suffered no direct monetary cost from the plaintiff's absence was not material, for this kind of disruption is sufficient evidence of undue hardship
to authorize the employer's failure to accommodate the employee's desire
to be absent from work.
In EEOC v. Mississippi College,' " the court considered whether the
religious freedoms of the first admendment prevent the application of
Title VII to the employment practices of educational institutions that are
owned, controlled, and operated by religious institutions. The court concluded that to include such institutions within the coverage of Title VII
would not in itself violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. However, if the religious institution later offered convincing evidence that a challenged employment practice resulted from discrimination on the basis of the employer's religion, the EEOC would be deprived
of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether religious discrimination was merely a pretext for some other form of discrimination. 12 '
The opinion in EEOC v. Mississippi College also is one of several cases
decided in 1980 that addressed in some respect the issue of whether a
plaintiff had standing to litigate. The charging party whose charge the
EEOC wanted to investigate in that case was a white female who wished
to challenge discrimination against blacks. Because her charge claimed
that the discrimination against blacks deprived her of the benefits arising
122. The court applied the Fifth Circuit's requirement in Burdine that the employer
shoulder the burden of persuasion once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Id. at
120-21.
123. 615 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
124. 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 485.
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from association with racial minorities in the working environment, unaffected by discrimination, the charging party satisfied the kinds of standing requirements imposed by article III of the Constitution and thus also
gave her standing to challenge these practices in the administrative context of a Title VII charge.12 In Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co.,12 the
court held that the plaintiff presently suffered from a threat of discriminatory treatment and therefore had sufficient standing to pursue a Title
VII claim. The court reasoned that, by virtue of the agreement between
Stevedoring Companies and the unions that each longshore gang would
be composed equally of blacks and whites, he might be deprived of an
employment opportunity on any occasion when there were in fact more
black persons in the black union than there were white persons in the
white union.
Educational institutions generally did not fare very well in the 1980
decisions. In addition to Whiting v. Jackson State University and EEOC
v. Mississippi College, the court heard two other cases in which universities were the defendants. In Jepsen v. Florida Board of Regents,12 8 the
court reversed a judgment entered for the university in an action brought
by a female associate professor who alleged that she had been a victim of
discrimination in promotions and compensation. The trial court had required the plaintiff to establish a clear abuse of discretion by the university before the court would be prepared to substitute its judgment about
the plaintiff's qualifications for that of the academic officials. The court of
appeals makes it clear in Jepsen that the same standards for evaluating a
plaintiff's prima facie case and a defendant's countervailing evidence will
apply when faculty promotions or pay decisions are challenged under
Title VII as in any other context. In Gay v. Board of Trustees of San
Jacinto College,'"9 the employer also failed to prevail. The school argued
that the plaintiff's immediate supervisor had no authority to terminate
employees. Although the supervisor had become very irritated with the
plaintiff and summarily terminated her services, the university argued
that it was not bound by the actions of the supervisor. However, the college held the supervisor out as a person having authority over those under
his supervision. The employee perceived that the supervisor had authority to discharge her, and the college could not then escape its responsibilities for the racially discriminatory conduct of the supervisor because of
the policy, unknown to the employee, that limited the supervisor's power
to terminate.
126.
127.
Bailey,
128.
129.

Id. at 483-85.
613 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Longshoremen's Local 1830 v.
49 U.S.L.W. 3643 (Mar. 3,1981).
610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
608 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Federal employees who failed to follow the correct procedures for
processing claims found little sympathy from the court in 1980. In Newbold v. United States Postal Service,180 the court affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiff's claim because he did not file a timely suit after receiving
the EEOC's denial of his claim. He also could not sue the union and the
equal employment opportunity officer at the Postal Service under Title
VII, for the only proper party under the provisions authorizing actions by
federal employees is the head of a department, agency, or unit.131 The
plaintiff could not sue the Postal Service under section 1981 because of
the exclusive, preemptive role of Title VII in redressing employment discrimination claims in the federal sector.8 3 Because of the breadth of this
policy consideration, the court concluded that the plaintiff also could not
be permitted to maintain actions under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983,
1985, or 1986138 against any individuals or the union. A federal sector employee who failed to comply with valid requirements for the administrative processing of his complaint saw his claim dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies in Johnson v. Bergland.'1 Finally, a federal agency saw its judgment affirmed under the clearly erroneous stan3
dard, when the court concluded, in Tortorici v. Harris,""
that there had
been sufficient evidence to justify the district court's conclusion that the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection were unfavorable interviews and a perception that time and money spent training her would ultimately be a
waste of time, rather than that she was rejected because of her race.
Two other Fifth Circuit opinions considered questions involving the nature of a prima facie case that involved different issues than those under
3
3
consideration in the court's opinion in Burdine.16 In Ramirez v. Sloss,' 7
the court noted that the Title VII model for the plaintiff's prima facie
case was not the only way in which a prima facie case could be made out.
Specifically, in an action brought under sections 1981, 1983, and 1985(3),
the plaintiff was able to make out a prima facie case of discrimination
against himself and a class consisting of resident aliens without any resort
to statistics, for the city had a written personnel policy that favored
United States citizens, and city officials had told the plaintiff and others
that it had such a citizen preference policy. Under those circumstances,
when the policy on its face was discriminatory and violated the constitu-

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

614 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1980).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
See Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
14 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 (1976).
614 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1980).
610 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (1981).
615 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1980).
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tional protection of aliens, no statistics would be required. In Ramirez v.
Hofheinz,'5 s the court affirmed a judgment for the employer, holding that
the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case because the evidence did not establish that the plaintiff was qualified for the kinds of
jobs that were the object of his claim.
Apart from cases that considered attorney's fees and remedies issues
and the age discrimination and handicap discrimination cases that are
discussed in the remainder of this article, the other employment discrimination decisions of the Fifth Circuit dealt with minor procedural points
or very narrow factual issues that are unlikely to be of any significance to
anyone other than the persons who were parties to those cases. " 9
VII.

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND REMEDIES

Cases involving the question of whether to award attorney's fees and
the amount of such fees continued to appear on the court of appeals'
docket." 0 Two cases illustrate the caution that a district court must use
in relying upon prevailing rates in the community in which the lawsuit is
tried as the basic measure of reasonable attorney's fees. In Jones v. Armstrong Cork Co.,"" the court affirmed a decision that based the fees
awarded to the plaintiff's attorney on the rates that generally prevailed in
Macon, Georgia, rather than on the significantly higher rates that had
been achieved in a settlement between the same defendant and lawyers
from the New York offices of the Legal Defense Fund."' In contrast, in
Neely v. City of Granada," the court refused to follow the decision of
the district court and made a direct determination on its own of the
proper fee amount. The trial court apparently had used its perception of
the local maximum fee to set a very low cap on the appropriate hourly
rate. However, the plaintiffs had fully prevailed and had obtained relief
against virtually all employment practices of the city in all of its depart138. 619 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1980).
139. See, e.g., Panlilio v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1980);
EEOC v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 623 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1980); Nilsen v. City
of Moss Point, Miss., 621 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Western Elec. Co., 618 F.2d
1110 (5th Cir. 1980); Foster v. Swift & Co., 615 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1980).
140. In Richards v. Reed, 611 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), the court reminded
litigants that attorney's fees claims should be pursued in the name of the plaintiff who is the
real party in interest, rather than in the attorney's name.
141. 630 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
142. This case also contains a significant practice pointer. Because there was no proof
that a person characterized as a "paralegal" actually performed services that might otherwise have been performed by a lawyer, as opposed to more clerical tasks, her hours were not
compensated. Instead, any costs associated with this individual were treated as part of the
lawyer's overhead, for which the attorney's fee compensates. Id. at 325-26.
143. 624 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ments. The uncontroverted evidence showed that a significantly higher
award would be reasonable for the services. By limiting the award to the
maximum, but low local rate, the district court in effect had failed to
consider any factors other than the local rate. Similarly, other district
court judges who failed to give careful and explicit attention to each of
the factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 14 4 in
attorney's fees award decisions found themselves subject to reversal and a
14 5
remand for further findings.
In EEOC v. Strasburger,Price, Kelton, Martin & Unis,1 4 intervenors
in an action against a Dallas law firm challenged the adequacy of an
award of $2,500 assigned to their attorney, a professor at Southern Methodist University School of Law. The attorney had testified that he spent
236.91 hours on behalf of the intervenors for which he claimed that his
usual hourly rate of $60 should be applied. The court below had accepted
the hours given but made the following findings: that the principal burden of prosecuting the suit had been upon the EEOC; the benefits that
resulted to the intervenors under the settlement agreement that resolved
the case were primarily brought about by the EEOC's efforts, rather than
by their counsel; the discovery efforts of the intervenors were sparse and
sketchy and had relied to a large extent on EEOC's prosecution of the
case; and much of the discovery that had been undertaken perhaps was
superfluous because intervenors could have relied more than they did
upon available EEOC efforts. The district court also had discounted
much of the attorney's time that apparently was spent in attempting to
support the terms and conditions on which his clients would intervene in
the case. 47 Although the effective hourly rate awarded by the district
judge amounted to $10.55 per hour, the court of appeals found the decision below to be within the discretion of the judge in considering attorney's fees. The fact that the district judge had noted that the attorney for
whom fees were sought was a law teacher who did not have the kind of

144. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
145. See, e.g., Hardy v. Porter, 613 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1980); Gay v. Board of Trustees of
San Jacinto College, 608 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1979). Although the court rarely found that an
award to the defendant was justified, see, e.g., Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617
F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1980), in one case the total lack of any evidence from the plaintiff to
substantiate his claims, which were dismissed at the close of his evidence, authorized an
award to the defendants: Harris v. Plastics Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam). In that case the court held that a claim may be "frivolous" if it is wholly lacking a
foundation, even if the plaintiff proceeds in subjective "good faith." The court of appeals
not only approved the district court's fee award but also treated the appeal as a frivolous
appeal for which the defendant should receive damages, including attorney's fees, and taxed
the plaintiff with double costs, pursuant to Fan. R. APP. P. 38.
146. 626 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1980).
147. The attorney's clients wanted to be parties as "Jane DMes." Id. at 1273.
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overhead expense associated with a law office also did not make the decision erroneous. Instead, the trial court merely reflected the reality that
some portion of a fee award typically is allocable to reimbursing counsel
for overhead expenses he has incurred. If counsel has not incurred such
expenses, this factor may at least be considered. In dissent, Judge Tate
expressed concern that the opinion of the district court did not clearly
articulate its conclusion on each of the factors in Johnson and that, with
a proper application of those factors, a much higher fee would have been
awarded." 8
Although none of the Fifth Circuit's 1980 opinions discuss remedies issues at length, there are a few interesting comments about the scope of
the discretion given to the district courts in awarding back pay. In Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc.,14 9 the court held that it was within the district
court's discretion to include unemployment compensation benefits as part
of the plaintiff's interim earnings" and to exclude from the back pay
calculation any interest and any health insurance premiums that the employer would have paid. Dictum in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Burdine
v. Texas Department of Community Affairs"" explicitly directed the district court to deduct unemployment compensation in calculating back
pay. In Falcon v. General Telephone Co., 1'5 a decision that is otherwise
strongly pro-plaintiff, the court upheld the discretion of the trial court to
deny front pay.
The time frame within which back pay may be recovered in Title VII
cases remains unclear. Although cases such as Fisher v. Procter & Gamble
Manufacturing Co.1 8 and Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.'"
seem to stress that liability (and hence, remedies for the illegal conduct)
must be predicated only on acts of discrimination that occurred during
and after the 180-day charge filing period, dictum in Crawford v. Western
Electric Co.11 5 suggests a different rule.
In Fisher, a case in which the employer's rather subjective system for
promotions was under attack, the court of appeals affirmed the liability
finding below because it was based on specific practices that occurred
"within the appropriate statutory frame," rather than on prior wrongs
148. 626 F.2d at 1278 (Tate, J., dissenting).
149. 631 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
150. To arrive at the net back pay award under Title VII, any interim earnings must be
deducted from the amount the plaintiff would have been paid in the job at issue. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
151. 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
152. 626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 49 U.S.L.W. 3737 (Apr. 7, 1981).
153. 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 929 (1981).
154. 610 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1980).
155. 614 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
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that occurred before the 180-day charge filing period. 15' Similarly, in
Gonzalez the court stated that the plaintiff would have to show liability
based on discriminatory employment practices within the 180-day
period.'
At the outset Crawford is consistent with these cases, for the court observes that "the court may base liability on acts occurring anytime during
or after the charge filing period." 58 However, the court in dicta also
states that "liability of the employer for back pay may be based on acts
occurring outside the two-year back pay period if a current violation is
shown. . . ...
" Citing Miller v. Miami Prefabricators,Inc.,160 this panel
of the court seems to suggest that, because there is a provision in Title
VII that limits back pay to the two years preceding the filing of a charge
with the EEOC,' 6' it follows that discrete acts of discrimination, such as a
specific failure to promote that happened before the 180-day period, may
be the basis of back pay liability so long as the same system for making
promotions is in effect during the 180-day charge filing period.
This conclusion seems to violate the Supreme Court's holding in
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans 6 2 that, even "in a proceeding in which
the status of a current practice is at issue," a discriminatory act that has
not been made the basis of a timely charge "is merely an unfortunate
event in history which has no present legal consequences.'" 6 To call a
violation a "continuing" one does not alter this conclusion if the "continuing violation" concept is being used in its proper context, i.e., to prevent
the defendant from arguing that, because the plaintiff failed to act
promptly the first time there was an act of discrimination pursuant to an
illegal policy, he may not attack later illegal acts done pursuant to that
same policy.'" The time barred acts are not revived under the continuing
violation theory. Rather, the theory permits current acts to escape any
limitations defense.
The panel in Crawford apparently believed that the two-year proviso
on back pay would be superfluous if discriminatory acts that occurred
before the 180-day charge filing period could not give rise to back pay
liability. However, there is an appropriate role for the proviso that is consistent with Evans. It arises when there is discrimination in compensa156. 613 F.2d at 540.
157. 610 F.2d at 249.
158. 614 F.2d at 1309.
159. Id. (emphasis in original).
160. 438 F. Supp. 176, 178-80 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.5(g) (1976).
162. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
163. Id. at 558.
164. This rationale for the continuing violation concept is explained in Local 1424, Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960).

19811

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1053

tion, a violation that is analogous to a continuing nuisance. The discrete
act of discrimination occurs when the employer discriminates for reasons
made unlawful by Title VII by paying one employee less than another
who performs the same job. However, each day the employee receives unequal pay for equal work, the old act of discrimination injures him again.
Even if the employee were placed in the job years before the charge is
filed, the proviso enables him to recapture up to two years of his lost
wages. This is the only Title VII violation in which the economic loss that
occurs each day is itself a violation of the statute, for the essence of the
obligation to pay equally for equal work is the unlawfully low amount
paid for the services as they are rendered. In contrast, a failure to hire or
a failure to promote is a discrete act of discrimination, complete when the
vacancy in question was filled.' 6 As Evans makes clear, the fact that the
plaintiff is not in the same economic position that he would have realized
but for a past act of discrimination does not constitute a current violation
that gives rise to any liability.
As discussed earlier, the decisions in United States v. City of Alexan6
dria, 66 and United States v. City of Miami,17
although involving consent
decrees, illustrate that far reaching remedies, including numerical or percentage selection requirements, special seniority benefits and the like, are
still part of the arsenal of remedies under Title VII. In Moseley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,' " the court rejected the claims of several white
employees that a district court's remedial seniority to black class members amounted to displacement of white workers, in violation of Title VII
and section 1981. Although the effect of the remedial seniority order by
the district court was to force the white employees to work less desirable
work schedules, they remained in the same job classification and received
the same hourly wages as before. Their removal from more desirable job
assignments did not constitute job displacement.

VIII. ADEA CASES
Although there were many more cases involving claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act heard during 1980 than in 1979, the
cases for the most part did not involve important substantive issues.
Rather, most of the decisions reviewed evidence under the clearly erroneous standard to determine whether the district court's judgment should
165. See, e.g., Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9230 (N.D. Ga.
1979); Croker v. Boeing Co., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1783, 1786 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (a failure to
promote is a discrete act).
166. 614 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1980).
167. 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980).
168. 612 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1980).
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be affirmed. 6 9 The court again confirmed that an employer need only
come forward with evidence of reasons other than age to explain its conduct, rather than having to carry the burden of persuasion that it did not
discriminate on the basis of age, once the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case.7 0 As noted earlier, this approach to the order and allocation of
proof and the burden of persuasion differed from the position adopted by
the Fifth Circuit under Title VII. However, the court did point out one
significant difference that may exist between the model of a prima facie
case of racial discrimination derived from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green and a prima facie case under the ADEA. In McCorstin v. United
States Steel Corp.,'7 1 the court held that it is not a requirement of the
prima facie case that the person who replaced the employee (or, analogously, who was hired or promoted instead of the plaintiff) have been
under age forty. It is sufficient if the replacement were younger, even if he
were also within the age bracket protected by the ADEA.
The court did adopt substantive rules about two aspects of litigation
7
under the ADEA. First, in Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,1 2
the court explicitly held that there may be equitable tolling of the time
period within which a plaintiff must file his notice of intent to sue. In'so
holding, the court expressly adopted the reasoning it had used to engraft
P s
the equitable tolling doctrine on the time limitations under Title VII.
'
In Coke, there was some indication that the employer may have misrepresented to the plaintiff its intention to reinstate the plaintiff and
thereby have induced his forbearance. However, the court did believe that
the plaintiff had received unequivocal notice of his demotion when he not
only received formal notice of that change in status but actually began
work in a new position and started to receive reduced pay. In contrast,
the employer's conduct was not deemed sufficiently clear even to start the
running of the 180-day period for filing notice of intent to sue when there
were disputed facts about the understandings of the parties regarding an
employee who was told at one point he would be retired involuntarily but
then was kept on the payroll on "special assignment." Because of these
fact disputes, the court in Marshallv. Kimberly-Clark Corp.1" reversed a
summary judgment granted to the employer. The court also noted that

169. Carter v. Maloney Trucking & Storage, Inc., 631 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1980); Harpring
v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980); Houser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 627
F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980); Simmons v. McGuffey Nursing Home, Inc., 619 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.
1980).
170. Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
171. 621 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1980).
172. 616 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd en banc, 640 F.2d 584 (1981).
173. See Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
174. 625 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the statute of limitations for filing a suit begins at the same point as the
180-day notice filing period.
The second important conclusion by the court in ADEA matters involved the extent to which an employer may still retire an individual involuntarily before age seventy. In the companion cases of Jensen v. Gulf
Oil Refining & Marketing Co.'" and Renaudin v. Gulf Oil Corp.,'6 the
court concluded that a retirement plan is "bona fide" within the meaning
of the ADEA if it is genuine and pays substantial benefits. Under the
ADEA before its amendment in 1978, an employer was held not to violate
the Act if it retired an employee involuntarily pursuant to the terms of a
pre-ADEA benefit plan that used age sixty-five as its normal retirement
age but which gave the employer an option to force early retirement, provided the plan was otherwise bona fide and not of itself a subterfuge to
avoid the Act.1 7 Despite the 1978 amendments to the ADEA banning involuntary retirement before age seventy,'7 8 the court concluded that the
amendment did not apply retroactively to involuntary retirements that
occurred before April 6, 1978, the effective date of the amendment.
In Hickey v. Arkla Industries, Inc., 7 9 the court considered a request
for an interim award of attorney's fees for the work performed by plaintiff's attorney, who had succeeded on appeal in reversing the dismissal of
his client's cause of action. The court concluded that the attorney's fee
provision of the ADEA'8 0 should be construed similarly to the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award of 1976.181 The court felt constrained by
the opinion of the Supreme Court in Hanrahan v. Hamptons' to limit
interim counsel fees to situations in which the party has prevailed on the
merits of at least some of his claims. Because the court believed that
there was logically no difference in the intent of Congress in the two
attorney's fee award statutes, it held that it must deny the requested
interim award.
IX.

HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION

One of the more significant cases decided by the court during 1980 was
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,"'8 in which the court, in a case of first impres175.
176.
177.
version
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

623 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980).
623 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(2), 81 Stat. 603 (current
at 42 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. II 1978)).
42 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
624 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)).
100 S. Ct. 1987 (1980).
611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 246 (1980).
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sion in any of the circuits at the time it was argued, held that there is no
implied private cause of action under section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973." Despite Judge Goldberg's vigorous dissent, Judge Rubin,
writing for the majority, concluded that, using the tests set out by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash,'" there was no evidence of any intent to
permit a private cause of action under this statute. Qualified handicapped
persons thus must look to their administrative remedies, for which express provision is made under the statute, if they believe that a government contractor has failed to fulfill its affirmative action obligation to
them. Subsequent decisions in other circuits have relied heavily upon
Rogers in reaching a similar conclusion.186 Thus far, the Supreme Court
has declined certiorari in any of these cases.
The other handicap discrimination case decided during this term involved the claims of a federal employee. For federal employees the Rehabilitation Act, as amended,187 makes express provision for private remedies that follow the pattern of section 717 of Title VII." Although the
plaintiff initiated his complaint before the amendment that added an express cause of action for federal employees to the Rehabilitation Act, the
court concluded in Counts v. United States Postal Service' 89 that, because the plaintiff had persisted in litigation so long, he still had a pending claim at the time of the amendment and would be permitted now to
proceed with his claims based upon amended section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act." 0

184.
1979)).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Pub. L. No. 91-190, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. III
422 U.S. 66 (1975).
See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
631 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1980).
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980).

